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Federal Jurisdiction: Legislative
and Judicial Change
Carl McGowan*
Congress is presently considering legislation abolishing federal court
jurisdictionover disputes between citizens of different states. Concurrently,
the Burger Court has restrictedfederaljurisdictionin the areasof standing,
abstention, and habeascorpus review. The divestitures of federaljurisdiction
by these two meanspose distinctproblems relatingto the properallocationof
judicial power within our federal system. Judge McGowan examines these
problems and concludes that notions of finalty, efficiency, and a due regard
for the competence of state court systems militate infavor of reposinggreater
reliance on state courts, but that the Supreme Court should proceed with
caution in restricting or foreclosing federal courts to those who seek to
vindicate federally protected rights.

T

HE EXISTENCE side by side of full-scale state and federal court

systems has been a distinctive feature of "Our Federalism," to use
the phrase which Justice Black employed with almost mystical

reverence. 1 Characterized by large areas of overlapping subject matter
and many points of inevitable contact, it is a phenomenon not to be
found in most of the other federal republics around the globe. 2 For us,

however, the balance to be struck between the dual judicial sovereignties has been a constant preoccupation throughout our national existence, engaging deeply held loyalties and exciting controversies of
frequently high emotional intensity between differing visions of the

limits of state and federal power. It has, in terms of ultimate signifi3
cance, been one of our great and continuing political issues.
*

Member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit. This article is based in part upon an address to the student body given in the
course of a visit to the Case Western Reserve University Law School as a Weatherhead
Lecturer. The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of his law clerks,
Kate Pressman and Miles Ruthberg, in its preparation.
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
2. See generally Riesenfeld & Hazard, FederalCourts in ForeignSystems, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 29 (1948).
3. The history of this controversy is reviewed in C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1969).
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It is an issue, however, that also implicates less dramatic-but
often no less important-interests than those deriving from clashing
philosophies of government. These are considerations of a professional
and technical nature that inhere in the distribution of functions between
state and federal courts, having to do with such things as achieving
maximum efficiency in the allocation of resources to dispute resolu-

tion; promoting clarity, certainty, and finality in the law; and easing
the burdens of litigation. 4 Views can and do differ about how to further
these goals, and such differences, although they lack the sharpness of
debate grounded in political ideology, complicate the task of reaching

an accommodation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the balance at any one point in
time is not a stable one; and the history of our dual judicial sovereignties is marked by tremendous variations in the allocation of tasks
between the two systems, as well as in the degree of impingement of
one upon the other. It is commonplace that, although the First
Congress was quick to create, under the option afforded it by the
Constitution, inferior federal courts and to invest them with some
portion of the jurisdiction contemplated by article rI,5 those courts for
6
over three-quarters of a century were cast in a singularly modest role.
It was not until the Civil War and its aftermath caused a rising tide of
nationalism that the business of the federal courts was substantially
enlarged. 7 But the force of that development was significantly broken
4. See generally ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
5. The nine heads of jurisdiction found in article III are not self-executing, and it is
generally agreed that Congress need not authorize the exercise of any of this jurisdiction.
See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12, 313-14 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]. But see
Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
6. The only major types of lower federal court jurisdiction provided by the First
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), were admiralty jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts over private civil actions between a citizen of the forum
state and an alien or citizen of another state, and jurisdiction over civil suits brought by
the United States. Id. §§ 9, 11. Limited jurisdiction over patent cases was provided for in
the immediately subsequent years. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109; Act of
Feb. 1, 1793, ch. I1, § 5, 1 Stat. 318.
7. In 1863, Congress passed a statute providing for the removal to federal court of
suits against federal officers. Act of Mar. 5, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755. The Civil
Rights Acts of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; and 1875, ch. 114, 18
Stat. 335, included jurisdictional provisions whose modem day counterparts are 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, & 1443 (1970). Most significantly, the lower federal courts were
invested with general federal question jurisdiction, at the option of either party, in the
1875 Judiciary Act, ch. 137, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 470. Diversity jurisdiction was also
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when Reconstruction faltered and then foundered in the swift undertow
8
of the return to normalcy.
The New Deal and World War II loosed new impulses toward the
exertion of national power, 9 and the federal courts moved with them.
The social and economic changes generated by these great events
presented the Warren Court with numerous opportunities to reexamine
the Constitution in the context of a society which would not have been
recognizable by its framers. Constitutional reinterpretation wrought by
the federal judiciary, 10 together with great activity by the Congress in
the fields of civil rights,1 1 environmental protection, 12 openness in
government, 3 and health and safety, 14 flooded the federal courts with
a whole new kind of litigation which, when added to normal judicial
15
burdens, has imposed severe strains both in terms of sheer volume
and in the novelty and complexity of the issues tendered.
True to our tradition of chronic concern with the functioning of the
expanded to include residents of any two different states, with the action to be brought in
the state of the defendant's residence or where the defendant was present. Id. § 1.
8. See, e.g., The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, raising the jurisdictional amount
in federal question and diversity cases to $2,000, limiting the provisions for removal to
federal court, and inserting stricter venue requirements.
9. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1976)) (providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction, id. § 27, 15 U.S.C.
78aa (1976)); National Labor Relations Act of 1934, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)); Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1970)) (amended 1950, 1956, 1960, 1962); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970))
(amended 1949).
10. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
11. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-1975e, 1995 (1970)); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1971,
1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1970)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79
Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,1973-1973bb-4 (1970)); Civil Rights Act of 1968,.
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28, 42 U.S.
C.);Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970)).
12. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
13. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 1, 80 Stat. 378 (1966),
as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976)); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 552, 552b, 556, 557 (1976)).
14. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1950 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 42, 49 U.S.C.); Consumer Product
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-284,
90 Stat. 503 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18 U.S.C.).
15. For statistics and comments on the increasing caseloads of federal courts, see
notes 45-69 infra and accompanying text.
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dual court system, the present moment is one of ferment in the field of
federal jurisdiction. Faced with the alternative of embarking upon a
course of seemingly endless expansion of the federal judiciary, the
Congress appears to be seriously considering the elimination of one of
the major heads of federal jurisdiction-and one going back to the First
Judiciary Act of 1789-diversity of citizenship.16 At the same time,
and perhaps due at least in part to a sense of frustration as it has
observed Congress continually expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Supreme Court appears to be limiting access to them by
such means as restricting the concept of standing, narrowing the reach
of federal habeas, 17 and insisting to a greater degree upon noninterference by federal courts with state court proceedings.
This latter development has, whether deservedly or not, caused
new clouds of controversy to swirl about the Supreme Court, emanating from those who had previously hailed the generally expansive
jurisdictional rulings of the Warren Court. 18 It is unhappily not the fate
of the Court as an institution to be free of periodic alarums and
excursions of this kind. But this situation may prompt the neutral
observer to reflect that, where federal jurisdiction is concerned, it
Would be well if the principal regulator of that jurisdiction, the
Congress, were consciously and continuously to keep its jurisdictional
grants under review, in order to relieve the federal courts of those
responsibilities which the public interest no longer compels them to
discharge. The shaping of federal jurisdiction to newly emerging needs
inevitably involves expansion, but effective judicial performance in
these new areas can be hampered by legislative neglect of the counterforce of contraction.
The present moment is thus an opportune one in which to contrast
the direct limitation of access to the federal courts by legislative action
with the more oblique impact on such access effected by evolving
judicial doctrine. Part I of this article will consider the first means of
limiting access by reference to a proposal pending in Congress which
would virtually eliminate diversity jurisdiction. The manner in which
the judiciary limits access is capable of examination in a variety of
decisional contexts, but will be analyzed in part II in the context of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in order to keep the discussion
within reasonable bounds.
16. See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 11222 (daily ed. Oct. 18,
1977); notes 19-97 infra and accompanying text; note 6 supra.
17. See discussion at notes 98-201 infra and accompanying text.

18. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 724-36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 502-03 (1977).
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I.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS BETWEEN
PARTIES OF DIVERSE CITIZENSHIP

Diversity of citizenship has been a basis of federal jurisdiction
since the First Judiciary Act in 1789.19 Indeed, while the current
Congress is considering abolishing diversity jurisdiction and further
expanding federal question jurisdiction, 20 the First Congress chose to
allow federal trial courts to hear, in addition to maritime controversies,
private civil suits only between parties of different state or national
21
citizenship.
Actually, there are two types of suits that have been generally
referred to as diversity cases, but this label properly belongs only to
one of these. "Diversity of citizenship" refers to the situation in which
the plaintiff resides in a different state than does the defendant. In
early 1978, the House of Representatives passed a bill introduced by
Congressman Kastenmeier which would completely abolish this diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 22 The legislation would retain, however, federal jurisdiction over suits between aliens or foreign states, on
the one hand, and citizens of the United States, on the other. 23 Such
alienage, as well as diversity, jurisdiction has existed since 1789.24 A
19. First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §1, 1 Stat. 73.
20. See notes 34-37, 47-50, and 98 infra and accompanying text.
21. First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73. The jurisdictional amount was
$500. Id. It was not until the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 470, that
diversity jurisdiction was expanded to include cases in which neither party resides in the
forum state.
22. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 11222 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1977).
The legislation would strike the diversity of citizenship jurisdictional provision, 28
U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) (1970), and make conforming amendments to current venue, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (1970), and removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), provisions. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) §§ l(a), 3(d), (e). The record
shows that, under a special suspension of the rules, House debate on the bill was limited
to forty minutes. 124 CONG. REC. 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978), and amendments to the
bill were not allowed, id. at 1561 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman).
23. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978)
§§ I(c)(l), (2). The amount-in-controversy requirement would be raised from $10,000 to
$25,000, which approximately compensates for the growth in monetary inflation since
1958, when the requirement was raised from $3,000 to $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 § 2. In 1976, the amount in controversy was less than $25,000
in over one quarter of all diversity cases. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform: Hearings on H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 223-24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 9622] (statement of
Charles Alan Wright).
24. Alienage jurisdiction has always encompassed suits between the alien (or foreign
state) and a citizen of a non-forum state. The First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73
(1789). See also note 21 supra.
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bill identical to the Kastenmeier proposal is presently under con5
sideration in the Senate.2
26
The Kastenmeier proposal would also retain federal interpleader
The Federal Interpleader Act 27 does not contain the Strawbridge v.
Curtiss28 requirement of complete diversity-that every plaintiff reside in a different state from every defendant. 29 The minimal diversity
requirement in interpleader, 31 together with a low ($500) jurisdictional
amount,3 1 and liberal venue and personal service provisions,3 2 has the
potential of greatly facilitating the settlement of multiparty claims in
which personal jurisdiction over all necessary parties cannot be effectuated in the courts of any state.
Support for the Kastenmeier bill or other proposals sharply curtailing diversity jurisdiction has been forthcoming from the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the National College of Trial Lawyers, the ACLU, the NAACP, 33 and the "Bork Commission.' ,34 In his
annual message to the ABA in 1976, Chief Justice Burger called for
abolition of diversity jurisdiction. 35 Perhaps most significantly, in
1977 the Conference of State Chief Justices adopted a resolution
expressing the willingness of the state courts to assume all or part of
36
the federal diversity jurisdiction.
It thus appears likely that the federal courts may soon be relieved of
25. S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
26. See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978) § 3(b)(2).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1970).
28. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) requires complete diversity in ordinary diversity suits.
However, complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (sustaining federal interpleader action in which
complete diversity did not exist).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1970).
31. Id. § 1335(a).
32. Id. §§ 1397, 2361.
33. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., SECTION BY
SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 9622 at 4 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as SECTION
BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 9622].

34.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, RE-

PORT ON THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

(R. Bork, Chairman, 1977) [hereinafter

cited as BORK COMMISSION REPORT].

35. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,62 A.B.A.J. 443,444 (1976).
36. 9 THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1977, at 6. For the significance of this resolution, see
the discussion at notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text. See also ALI STUDY, supra
note 4, §§ 1301-07 (comments at 99-161, 468, showing ALI's recommended changes in
diversity jurisdiction which would eliminate approximately one-half of the current federal diversity caseload). The Department of Justice has sponsored legislation in the current
Congress which would eliminate the assertion of diversity by an in-state plaintiff. See 9
THE THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1977, at 5.
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the obligation to settle those disputes which originally were the only
significant category of dispute within their jurisdiction. It should be
noted, however, that the current legislation is not the first attempt to
severely curtail diversity jurisdiction. Such legislation was twice favorably reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in the
1930's, 37 and controversy concerning the propriety of federal diversity
jurisdiction had existed even before that time. 38 It appears likely that a
major reason for the retention of this basis of jurisdiction in the face of
such challenges has been a reluctance to divest the federal courts of the
one major grant of authority which the founding fathers decided they
must have. 39 With some circularity, the long tradition of diversity
jurisdiction may have contributed heavily to its continuance, even
though a persuasive rationale for diversity has become increasingly
difficult to explicate. 4°
Admittedly, certain of the arguments voiced over the years against
this source of jurisdiction have been time-bound, directed principally
at evils peculiar to the context in which the arguments were raised. For
instance, the effort by Senator Norris to abolish the jurisdiction in the
1930's was in response to the unsympathetic attitude displayed by the
federal courts towards organized labor.4 1 Ultimately, of course, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 42 prohibiting federal courts from enjoining
labor activities, met Senator Norris' particular objection to diversity
jurisdiction.
As long ago as 1928, however, an argument was stated against
retention of diversity jurisdiction which remains equally relevant to the
contemporary situation. After examining the rationales put forth for
diversity, Henry Friendly, long before his transition to the federal
bench, concluded that diversity was "out of the current of [the]
nationalizing forces" of that day. 43 The work of the federal courts in
administering federal law would grow as "a reflex of the general
growth of federal political power, [which] will not abate, since it is
37. S. REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932); S. REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1930). Both proposals were, of course, defeated.
38.

See generally, F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME

COURT (1928).
39. Id. at 8-10.
40. See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964).
41. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297,
1341-42 (1954).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976).
43. Friendly, The HistoricBasis of DiversityJurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483,510
(1928).
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responsive to deep social and economic causes," and these "unifying
tendencies of America here make for a recession of jurisdiction to the
States. "I Central to Judge Friendly's prescient analysis was the notion that federal courts should not needlessly divert their energies away
from matters that they are best suited to entertain, the determination
and application of federal law. Implicit in this notion is the realization
that there are practical limits to the number of cases which can be
effectively handled by the federal courts.
The growing federal workload is presently the primary impetus
behind proposals to curtail severely, or to abolish altogether, diversity
jurisdiction. 45 The number of civil cases filed in the district courts in
1977 was 130,597, 46 an increase of over eleven percent from 1975, 47
and of almost fifty percent from 1970,48 when the last increase in the
number of federal district court judgeships was authorized. Approximately one quarter of the civil suits filed last year-nearly 30,000
cases-were grounded in diversity. 49 Of course, the proportion of all
federal suits which are based in diversity has fallen during this period,
since the growth in the federal caseload is primarily the result of a great
expansion in the number of suits raising a federal question. 50 The
extension of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to actions
taken by the states, in conjunction with the broadening of the scope of
these provisions and those of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, have multiplied the number of
such suits. These developments, and the reemergence of post-Civil
War statutes as a means of vindicating federal rights against state
officers, 5 have combined to increase greatly the range of controversies
encompassed within federal question jurisdiction. In addition, the
Civil Rights Acts of the 1960's, and comprehensive and far-reaching
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 8 (Mar. 10-I1, 1977) (approving complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction "except as it might apply to the courts of the Pacific Trust territories"); Hearings
on H.R. 9622, supra note 23 (testimony of Hon. Edward T. Gignoux, Hon. Henry J.
Friendly, and Charles Alan Wright).
46.

1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 81 [hereinafter cited as 1977 REPORT]. The years referred to are
fiscal years.
47. The number of civil cases filed in 1975 was 117,320. Id.
48. The number of civil cases filed in 1970 was 87,321. Id.
49. 29,784 civil suits with jurisdiction grounded in diversity were filed in 1977. Id. at
A-25. In approximately one-half of these cases, the plaintiff was a resident of the forum
state.
50. For instance, over 13,000 civil rights cases (excluding prisoner petitions) were
filed in 1977, as compared with 5,138 in 1971. Id. at 82. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 5, 1977 Supplement at 5.
51. See, e g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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federal legislation dealing with problems such as environmental protection, occupational safety, and consumer protection, 52 have created
new causes of action for private litigants and expanded the regulatory
and enforcement responsibilities of53 the federal government and,
concomitantly, of the federal courts.
Thus, diversity jurisdiction can hardly be blamed for the growing
burden on the federal courts, and the movement to curtail that jurisdiction is not intended to remove the effective causes of that burden.
Rather, it proceeds from the view that, assuming the federal courts are
in a condition of excessive strain, 54 those cases which least require a
federal forum should be the first to be removed from the federal
docket. This approach may be contrasted with that of the recent
judicial actions described in part II of this article. The efforts to reduce
the scope of federal habeas corpus, limit federal court interference with
state judicial processes, and place greater reliance on state remedial
processes directly cut back the caseload growth that has resulted from
the increase in federal question cases.
Of course, an alternative way to deal with the increasing burden on
the federal courts is to increase the number of federal judges. The
current Congress is expected to authorize a nearly thirty percent increase in district and appellate judgeships. 5 5 An ever-expanding number of judges, however, is not a satisfactory solution, particularly at
the appellate level. As the number of appeals court judges increases, it
52. See notes 11-14 supra.
53. Litigation under the Social Security statute has greatly increased in recent years,
although the basic legislation was enacted in the 1930's. See note 9 supra. 10,095 Social
Security cases were filed in 1977, as opposed to 1,792 Social Security cases filed in 1971.
1977 REPORT, supra note 46, at 82.
54. In 1977, the civil cases pending (as opposed to filed) in federal district courts
numbered 153,606, an increase of 9.6% over the previous year. 1977 REPORT, supra note
46, at 80. Nevertheless, largely as a result of the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1976), requiring expedited treatment of criminal cases, the median
interval from filing to trial in federal civil cases in which trial was completed has
lengthened to twelve months. 1977 REPORT, supra note 46, at 161.
55. The Omnibus Judgeship Bill, S. 11, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 8507
(daily ed. May 24, 1977), was passed by the Senate on May 24, 1977. The Senate Bill
provides for 113 new federal district judgeships and 35 federal appellate judgeships. It
also splits the Fifth Circuit into a new Fifth Circuit consisting of Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone, and creates an Eleventh Circuit composed of
Louisiana and Texas. On February 7, 1978, the House passed H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 717 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978), which is similar to S. 11 except that it
leaves the Fifth Circuit intact and provides for three fewer district judgeships. A
compromise version of the bill has recently been voted out of a House-Senate conference committee. The new bill creates 152 new federal judgeships, 117 of which are in the
district courts. Conferees Urge 152 More Judges On U.S. District and Appeals Courts,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1978, at 39, col. 1.
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becomes increasingly difficult to administer the work of the circuits or
to resolve cases en banc.56 Furthermore, if the number of circuits were
significantly increased, the likelihood of inter-circuit conflict, requiring resolution by the Supreme Court, would also increase. Finally,
even if the number of federal lower court judges could be substantially
augmented without loss in effectiveness, it would be impossible to
without substantially rereduce the workload of the Supreme Court
57
structuring the federal judicial system.
We have seen that under the Kastenmeier proposal, the federal
district courts would be relieved of adjudicating nearly all 58 of the
approximately 30,00059 diversity cases, of a total of over 170,000 civil
and criminal filings, currently heard each year. 60 It has been argued
that this unloading would serve no useful purpose since these cases
simply end up in state courts where the dockets are often more
crowded than those of the federal courts. 6 1 Notwithstanding this fact, it
is pointed out in favor of the divestiture that, although the total
increase in the caseload of the state courts would equal the total
decrease in the caseload of the federal courts, the increased burden
upon the courts of any one state would be slight: 62 the 30,000 cases
now heard by 373 federal judges 63 would be adjudicated before more
56. The entire court of appeals, as well as the district courts in the circuit, are bound
by the decisions of that court of appeals, which are usually made by three-judge panels.
Thus, it may be desirable to hear particularly important or novel cases en banc, where all
the judges of the court of appeals for the circuit who are in regular active service
participate. JUDICIAL CODE AND JUDICIARY ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
57. Recent proposals for restructuring have focused on the creation of a national
court of appeals in addition to the current courts of appeals. See Haynsworth, A New
Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973); COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PRO-

CEDURES: RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]. But see BORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 17-20. See also
Leventhal, A Modest Proposalfora Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
881 (1975).
58. The proposal retains federal "alienage" diversity jurisdiction for the federal
courts. Note 23 supra and accompanying text. As Professor Wright has noted, however,
"in terms of workload it makes little difference whether alienage jurisdiction is retained." SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 9622, supra note 33, at 1.
59. 1977 REPORT, supra note 46, at A-25.
60. Id. at 4-5, 6.
61. E.g., Frank, FederalDiversity Jurisdiction-AnOpposing View, 17 S.C.L. REV.
677, 680--81 (1965). In his testimony before the House subcommittee, Mr. Frank stated
that in Chicago, for example, there is a delay of 37 months for state civil jury trials, but
only II months for federal civil jury trials. Hearings on H.R. 9622, supra note 45, at 234
(statement of John Frank).
62. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 3-4,
137-52; Hearings on H.R. 9622, supra note 45, at 211 (statement of Hon. Henry J.
Friendly).
63. Although Congress has authorized 398 federal district judgeships, 25 of these
judgeships were vacant as of June 30, 1977. 1977 REPORT, supra note 46, at 3.
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than 5,600 state court judges. 64 In fact, if all these diversity cases were
shifted to the courts of the states, their dockets would be increased by
65
an average of approximately one-half of one percent.
Moreover, there is reason to conclude that the decrease in the
burden upon the federal courts will not be offset by an exactly
commensurate increase in the burden upon state courts. First, as
Professor Charles Alan Wright has pointed out, there is a threshhold
issue which must be considered in federal diversity that is not present if
the case is heard in state court: whether or not the requirements of
diversity jurisdiction are met.66 State courts of general jurisdiction
generally need not inquire into the true domicile of the parties, whether
there can be pendent jurisdiction, and other technical matters involved
in the assertion of federal diversity jurisdiction. Second, federal judges
67
are less familiar with state law than are the judges of the state courts.
This may increase the time necessary to render a decision or lead to
invocation of the expensive, delay-producing mechanisms of abstention 68 or interjurisdictional certification. 69 Indeed, the increased use of
64.

NATIONAL COURTS STATISTICS PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE

COURTS-1978 REPORT [hereinafter cited as 1978 REPORT].
Only 1,713 diversity cases were appealed from the district courts to the courts of
appeals in 1977 (approximately six percent of all diversity filings arising from the district
courts in that year). See 1977 REPORT, supra note 46, at 68, A-25. Thus, the removal of
diversity jurisdiction would not have as great an impact upon the federal appellate
caseload as it would have on the caseloads of the district courts. In addition, assuming
that a comparable percentage of these diversity cases will be appealed in state courts, the
resulting increase in the caseload of state appellate courts will be slight. Indeed, as a
general rule, state appellate courts have lower workloads than do the circuit courts. For
example, in 1975, approximately 20% more appeals were filed before each federal
appellate judge than were filed before each state appellate judge. Compare 1977 REPORT,
id. at 65a with 1978 REPORT, supra.
65. These figures are based on the 1978 REPORT, supra note 64. Forty-two states,
representing 84.4% of the population, replied to questionnaires and reported that about
5,632 judges handled 6,285,865 cases filed in state courts of general jurisdiction in 1975.
Assuming a proportionate level of filings for the remaining 15.6% of the population, the
total state filings for 1975 were approximately 7,448,000.
66. See Hearings on H.R. 9622, supra note 23, at 227 (remarks of Charles A.
Wright).
67. It should be noted that whereas federal district courts do not encompass territory
in more than one state, all of the courts of appeals except that of the District of Columbia
Circuit routinely hear diversity appeals from more than one state. It is unlikely that those
appointed to the federal bench are at the time of their appointment familiar with the law
of more than one state. Thus, the difficulties engendered by the Erie doctrine may be
especially apparent at the federal appellate level.
68. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). See also C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 203-05 (2d ed. 1970).
69. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (remanding diversity
case in which court of appeals had refused certification, stating: "[w]e do not suggest
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certification by federal courts of state law questions to the highest court
of the state7" is a strong, independent indication of the disutility of
diversity jurisdiction. When a federal judge finds it necessary to resort
to this procedure, he has conceded that at least to some extent he can
' 71
act only as the "ventriloquist's dummy."
In order to evaluate fully the appropriateness of the elimination of
most federal diversity jurisdiction, it is important to recognize that it is
but one aspect of a larger effort to redistribute cases, as well as to
improve the efficiency of the federal courts. 72 Indeed, it certainly
would be unfortunate if the federal courts were to be divested of cases
73
which it is conceded they are constitutionally empowered to hear,
simply because of currently heavy caseloads. It is thus significant that
in addition to severely curtailing diversity jurisdiction, the Kastenmeier legislation would also abolish the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question cases. 74 Currently, only a few types of
federal question cases are subject to this requirement. It has never
applied to section 198375 suits against state officers, where jurisdiction
is based on 28 U.S.C. section 1343 rather than the general federal
question jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1331. Then, in
1976, the Ninety-Fourth Congress enacted a further exception to the
76
amount-in-controversy requirement, for suits against federal officers.
Thus, in addition to a small number of miscellaneous private actions
raising a federal question, the requirement currently applies only to
that where there is doubt as to local law. . . resort to [available certification procedure]
is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and
helps build a cooperative judicial federalism."). See also Wright, The Federal Courts
and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 325-26 (1967).
70. Note, Civil Procedure-Scopeof Certification in Diversity Jurisdiction,29 RurGERS L. REV. 1155, 1155 (1976).
71. This expression was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). But see Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction:
A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 320-21, 326-27 (1977).
72. It is a healthy sign that the Kastenmeier proposal has made progress in the same
Congress that seems destined to authorize the largest single expansion of the federal
judiciary in our nation's history. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 718
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). That Congress in this respect is
dealing directly with the federal caseload problem indicates that the curtailment of
diversity is not merely a docket unloading device.
73. U.S. CONST. art. 11I.
74. H.R. 9622,95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
76. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (to be codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
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suits arising under federal common law, and to constitutional challenges to state law not encompassed by section 1983.17
Removal of the amount-in-controversy requirement for these cases
would go far toward establishing that federal courts have the jurisdictional power to adjudicate all federal questions, although the exercise of such power would continue to be constrained by equitable
considerations of self-imposed judicial restraint discussed in part II of
this article. Given the current anomalous situation wherein a price tag
on admission to federal court is attached to certain constitutional
claims but not to others, it seems eminently reasonable that a comprehensive and uniform federal question jurisdiction be established. It is
also not surprising that an effort to open up the federal courts for
vindication of any federal claim should be undertaken simultaneously
with the effort to channel non-federal question cases into state courts.
Indeed, throughout the congressional testimony on the Kastenmeier diversity proposal there was a usually unstated assumption that,
at this time in our nation's history, state cases belong in state courts
and, for the most part, federal cases belong in federal court. 78 One
factor sometimes said to support this view is that, under the Erie
doctrine, 79 federal courts must decide diversity cases on the basis of
state law, an often difficult task. But at the same time, the Erie
doctrine denies the fruits of that effort any authoritative reach beyond
the immediate case being decided. As a result, independent of whether
Erie chokes off the creativity of federal judges or delays the decisionmaking process in diversity cases, 80 bringing state law cases into the
77. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Until this term, implied rights of

action for damages against municipalities were also under section 1331. See Monell v.
Department of Social Serv. of the City of New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978).
78. Chief Justice Burger has stated explicitly that: "As a matter of principle, there is
no reason for federal jurisdiction where no federal question is at stake and when state

courts are available to provide an adequate forum." Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/MagistratesReform: Hearings on H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,

Civil Liberties and Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th
Cong., Ist Sess., at 143 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 9622) (statement of

Hon. Edward T. Gignoux, quoting letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger). See W.
BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 3-4 (1978).

79. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. For an example of the extremely intricate and demanding issues which must be
dealt with in applying Erie, see Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of DecisionAct: In
Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1977).
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federal courts under diversity jurisdiction may well impede the devel81
opment and evolution of authoritative state law.
Of course, abolishing diversity will not erase Erie or the occasional need for federal courts to pass on matters of state law. But in
82
practice the Erie doctrine is relevant primarily to diversity cases.
Moreover, that the converse situation-whereby state courts must pass
on questions of federal law-will remain even if federal diversity
jurisdiction is abolished is not an argument against such abolition. That
state judges must become expert expositors of federal law-and recent
decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned hereinafter indicate that
they are expected to be such-does not imply that federal judges
should use their limited resources ascertaining and applying state
83
law.
Finally, it is necessary to recognize that even if elimination of
diversity only decreases the burden on federal courts at the expense of
state courts, and even if the quality of the adjudication of such cases is
not improved or perhaps is marginally reduced, the opportunity cost of
continuing diversity jurisdiction is continued delay in the adjudication
of federal civil rights, environmental, labor and other cases, which I
think it is agreed generally present stronger arguments for resolution
within the federal judicial system.
The traditional justification which has been advanced in favor of
diversity jurisdiction is the possibility of bias in the state courts against
the out-of-state party. While this explanation is not to be found in the
constitutional debates or the legislative history of the First Judiciary
Act,84 it does find support in a passage by Chief Justice Marshall:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states
will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation,
81. See Hertz, Misreading the Erie Signs: The Downfall of Diversity, 61 Ky. L.J.
861 (1973). But see Shapiro, supra note 71, at 325-27.
82. Not all diversity cases require application of Erie. See, e.g., Huber Baking Co. v.
Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 951-53 (2d Cir.) (court found that federal law may
control even though jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship), cert. denied, 358

U.S. 829 (1958).
83. Erie is sometimes put forward as a reason to continue federal diversity jurisdiction. The argument is that exposure to issues of state law unfamiliar to federal judges
broadens their experience and creativity, and also affords new insight into the development of state law. But see Note, The Effect ofDiversity Jurisdiction on State Litigation, 40 IND. L.J. 566, 584-85 (1965) (concluding that state courts generally ignore
federal decisions on matters of state law). See also Wright, supra note 69.
84. See Friendly, supra note 43, at 487. But see Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTFMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948).
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to parties of every description, .

.

. the constitution itself

either entertains [such] apprehensions on this subject, or
views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for
the decision of controversies between
aliens and a citizen, or
85
between citizens of different states.
There are several difficulties with this argument, however, when
used as a rationale for the broad diversity jurisdiction that now exists.
The first of these is that there is no reason to suppose that the statutory
or common law of a state would favor a resident more often than it
would favor a nonresident. The equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as well as the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV, guarantee that a state may not have
one set of substantive rules govern claims by or against residents and
another set govern claims by or against nonresidents. Thus, the bias
rationale must be related to prejudice on the part of state juries as
factfinders or on the part of state judges, either as factfinders or in
applying state law. Since federal juries are composed of residents of
the state in which the federal court sits, albeit from a larger geographical area, differential federal and state jury bias is not likely. Admittedly, because federal judicial districts are generally larger than state
judicial districts, federal juries will tend to be more heterogeneous, but
this factor relates only to possible jury bias on the basis of the
rural/urban prejudice, not to state jury bias against an out-of-state
resident.
Nor do I see any incentive for state judges to exhibit bias against an
out-of-state party merely because he is a non-resident. Even if this
possibility does exist in a few state trial or appellate courts, it would
seem to be weak support for placing nearly 30,000 cases in the federal
rather than in the state courts. Moreover, if a litigant is clearly denied
due process in the state courts solely on the basis of his residence, he
may raise this fourteenth amendment claim in a petition for review by
86
the Supreme Court.
Even assuming there does exist significant bias against out-of-state
litigants, at least those from distant regions of the country, this cannot
serve as a rationale for the full panoply of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Since 1789, the jurisdiction has given the in-state plaintiff access to the
85. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
86. As a response to the bias argument, some opponents of broad diversity jurisdiction have concluded that it should be retained where there is an actual showing of bias
against the out-of-state party. See Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
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federal courts,8 7 and since 1875, actions between citizens of different
88
non-forum states have been included within diversity jurisdiction.
The granting of federal jurisdiction over these suits is more convincingly explained as generalized protection against bias within state
legislatures and judicial systems against interstate commercial activity. 89 In his study of historical bases of the jurisdiction, Henry Friendly
concluded that indeed there existed "a vague feeling that the new
[federal] courts would be strong courts, creditors' courts, businessmen's courts. ' ' 9 Whatever may have been the validity in 1789,
1875, or 1922 of arguments invoking the need for protection of
interstate commerce and mobility, the American Law Institute appears
to have been fully justified in concluding in 1969 that free movement
in interstate commerce had been "spectacularly achieved" and that
neither creditors nor business activity would be encumbered by elimi91
nation of federal diversity jurisdiction.
As often occurs in controversies among lawyers, the debate over
federal diversity jurisdiction has been phrased in terms of which side of
the disagreement bears the burden of persuasion. Those in favor of
retaining the jurisdiction argue that the proponents of change bear the
burden, 92 while those who argue for elimination of diversity assert that
because federal jurisdiction is permissive, proponents of it continually
bear the burden of explaining why the jurisdiction should be either
93
granted or retained.
I am disposed to side with those who would place the burden of
persuasion on the advocates of diversity jurisdiction. The federal
courts, unlike the state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction; the
potentially broad scope of the nine constitutionally authorized sources
of jurisdiction allows Congress to expand, reduce, or alter the precise
limits of federal judicial authority in response to the changing needs of
87. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Somewhat inexplicably, however, a
resident defendant cannot remove an action to federal court.
88. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
89. See Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administrationof Justice in the
Federal Courts, 47 A.B.A. REP. 250, 258-59 (1922) ("no single element in our governmental system has done so much to secure capital. . . throughout the West and South as
the existence of federal courts there, with a jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship
cases.").
90. Friendly, supra note 43, at 498.

91. ALI

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

(1969).
92. See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TEx. L. REV. 1, 15 (1964).
93. E.g., Hearingson H.R. 9622, supra note 78, at 213 (remarks of the Hon. Henry
J. Friendly).
COURTS 105
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the federal system. As long as the federal courts could effectively
operate with increasing caseloads, little harm resulted from adding to,
but seldom subtracting from, their jurisdiction. Today, however, the
structure of the federal judicial system cannot accommodate the
continued expansion deriving from congressional recognition of new
and urgent social problems, and consequently, delay and congestion
have become commonplace. In these circumstances, it is necessary to
weigh anew the reasons for and against each basis of federal jurisdiction. It is difficult to understand why federal courts should be
required to hear cases solely because the litigants are of diverse
citizenship, thereby drawing their energies away from the formulation
of federal law to the ascertainment and application of state law.
Moreover, substantial harm may result from diversity jurisdiction
even beyond its effect on the adjudication of other, more pressing
federal judicial business. As long as litigants can choose whether to
proceed within the state or federal judicial systems, they will opt for
that system which in their view provides better judges, procedures,
facilities and efficiency, all other factors being equal. It probably
remains true that the federal system is more attractive than many state
systems in these respects. 94 But if the justification for diversity jurisdiction comes down to the proposition that the federal courts provide
"better justice" than do state courts, then we must ponder why this
better justice should be granted on the fortuitous basis of diverse
citizenship, when it is denied in suits between parties residing in the
same state. More fundamentally, we must ask why differentials in
quality of adjudication should be tolerated. It is surely difficult to
believe that the Founding Fathers thought they were randomly dispensing better justice to some than to others when they provided for
diversity jurisdiction. If indeed state courts do not generally adjudicate
controversies as satisfactorily as do federal courts, a proposition which
seems nearly impossible to prove or disprove empirically, 95 then the
appropriate course of action is to improve the quality of state judicial
processes. Although much progress has been and is-being made toward
improving state judicial systems, that cause remains one of our most
important pieces of unfinished business. Continued access to the federal courts in diversity cases blunts one of the strongest incentives to
carry on with that task.
Federal jurisdiction should be maintained only in those situations
where the need for federal adjudication is clear. 96 I agree with the
94. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. Rsv. 1105 (1977).
95. See id. at 1116.
96. Professor David L. Shapiro argues that diversity jurisdiction is needed more in
some federal districts than in others, depending on relative docket congestion of the state
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consensus of those who testified before the Kastenmeier subcommittee
that, with respect to diversity jurisdiction, this need exists only in the
area of federal interpleader, which is the sole effective means for
settlement of some controversies, and alienage jurisdiction, which may
implicate foreign policy considerations and which serves the traditional purpose of diversity jurisdiction to the extent that bias may still exist
in state courts against foreign litigants.
No such considerations are demonstrably operative with respect to
diversity cases involving non-aliens and the policies underlying state
law. If those who lived under the Articles of Confederation justly
entertained fears of bias against out-of-state litigants, those fears are
surely belied by the past two hundred years in which the federal
republic has survived and flourished. It is demeaning to the very
concept of that republic to continue a jurisdiction which serves no
significant purpose other than to protect against that bias, and which
itself needlessly interferes with the pursuit by the federal courts of their
nationalizing functions.
The Supreme Court is currently asserting its confidence that state
judges are fully capable of entertaining and resolving--competently
and with devoted acceptance and understanding of the principles of the
Constitution-many questions of federal law. 97 It is peculiarly appropriate, therefore, that the Congress should, by acting to curtail diversity jurisdiction, accord similar recognition to the ability and willingness
of the state courts to apply state law fairly to all citizens who come
before them.
H.

JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT IN THE AREA OF FEDERAL SUPERVISION
OF STATE COURT PROCESSES: HABEAS CORPUS

A.

FederalSupervision in the Contemporary Era

As suggested above, the federal courts themselves play an important role in shaping the contours of federal jurisdiction. The Suand federal courts, state court bias, and other factors. He therefore proposes that the
judges in each district be empowered to decide, on a district-by-district basis, whether to
retain, curtail, or abolish diversity jurisdiction. Shapiro, supra note 71, at 339-41,
348-50. I do not think this proposal solves the major difficulties of diversity jurisdiction
identified in this article. Nor is there any obvious reason why litigants should be granted
or denied access to the federal courts on the basis of the differing estimations of the need
for such access by the federal judges of the various districts. Finally, even assuming
Congress could constitutionally do so, it seems highly doubtful that it would relinquish
its authority to control federal jurisdiction to the discretion of the federal judiciary.
97. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975).
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preme Court, as the final interpreter of the provisions of article III and
of legislative grants of jurisdiction within the contemplation of that
article, and also as the authoritative expositor of the appropriate use of
judicial restraint in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, is able to effect
expansion or contraction of the caseload of the federal courts and to
remove altogether certain types of cases from their jurisdiction. Although the Burger Court appears to be developing somewhat restrictive
interpretations of certain constitutional and statutory jurisdictional prerequisites, 98 much of the narrowing of federal jurisdiction effectuated
by the Court has proceeded from exercise of discretion to decline to
adjudicate cases within the congressionally authorized federal judicial
power. The Court's rationales for thus limiting the effective scope of
federal remedial authority have heavily implicated federalism concerns
similar to those described in the first section of this article. These
concerns have been most apparent in the Court's decisions in two
areas: the contraction of the scope of federal habeas, 99 and the delineation of the circumstances appropriate for abstention in the face of
related state court proceedings.
The latter development has occurred primarily through expansion
of the Younger doctrine. Younger v. Harris,1 0 decided in 1971, itself
followed a traditional maxim of our dual judicial structure:101 a federal
court should not enjoin a state criminal proceeding brought in good
faith as long as the federal claim may be raised as a defense in the state
proceeding. °2 In the years since Younger, however, the Court has
98. For cases exhibiting a restrictive interpretation of standing requirements, see
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). For cases restricting the availability

of the class action device, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973);

Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See generally Neuborne, ProceduralAssault on
the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545 (1977).
99. See text accompanying notes 137-46 infra.
100. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
101. This principle is embodied in the Anti-Injunction Act, first enacted in 1793, § 5, 1
Stat. 334. The current enactment in the Federal Judicial Code provides: "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
102. Although Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), may have cast doubt on
its continuing viability, the principle of federalism espoused in Younger was not new.
See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). (Dombrowskiheld that threatened
state court proceedings may be enjoined where a criminal statute infringing freedom of
expression is overbroad or vague "on its face."). See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86
YALE L.J. 1103 (1977). In addition, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), decided the
same day as Younger, established that the principle applies to requests for declaratory
relief as well as to injunctions.
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expanded the doctrine considerably. Federal courts have been admonished not to issue equitable relief against proceedings "of substance on
the merits" already initiated in state courts, 10 3 against civil proceedings brought by the state, I°4 against civil or criminal contempt proceedings (even though the state is not a party thereto), 105 or if there are
state proceedings against parties whose interests are closely "intertwined" with those of the federal plaintiff. 106 Moreover, in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd.,107 the Court appears to have established a general requirement that state appellate remedies be exhausted before affirmative
equitable relief can be provided by a federal court. Apparently, under
these circumstances, failure to perfect a state appeal forever bars
108
adjudication of the constitutional claim in the lower federal courts.
The Huffman exhaustion doctrine thus is analogous to that of federal
habeas'0 9 as it exists in 1978, where failure to pursue state procedures
for adjudication of federal defenses generally precludes collateral relief. 110
It is not surprising that the recent developments in Younger and in
federal habeas have proceeded along similar avenues. Federal habeas
corpus and federal equitable relief against state proceedings are both
mechanisms for federal court supervision of the application of due
103. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
104. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,444 (1977). The Court in Trainor,however,
declined to rule expressly upon whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation.
Id. at 444 n.8. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975), provided inferential
support for the Trainorruling by holding Younger applicable to civil proceedings "in aid
of and closely related to criminal statutes." Id.
105. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 (1977).
106. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348 (1975) (federal action brought by owners of
a theater to enjoin seizure of an allegedly obscene film could not be maintained while
criminal action pending against employees). Compare O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
499 (1974) (where state prosecution pending against named representative, class action
must fail).
107. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
108. See, e.g., id. at 609 n.21 ("Appellee may not avoid the standards of Younger by
simply failing to comply with the procedures of perfecting its appeal within the Ohio
judicial system.").
109. Both are doctrines of judicial, rather than administrative, exhaustion, and both
require exhaustion only of state processes; thus petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court need not be filed.
110. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). The Court in Sykes extended
the rule announced in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (barring federal habeas
review absent a showing of "cause" and "prejudice" attendant to a state procedural
waiver), to failure to object to admission of a confession at trial. 433 U.S. at 87. The
Court refused, however, to rule upon whether Francis should apply "where the criminal
defendant has surrendered, other than for reasons of tactical advantage, the right to have
all of his claims of trial error considered by a state appellate court." Id. at 88 n.12,
Nevertheless, it seems that Francis and Sykes portend no habeas relief in the latter
situation. See text accompanying notes 144-46 infra.
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process principles by state courts.1 11 One major distinction between the
mechanisms is temporal: the issue in habeas is whether a federal court
should intervene to vindicate federal rights after the state court system
has had the opportunity to adjudicate the federal question, while the
issue raised in the Younger cases is whether a federal court should
adjudicate the federal claim before the state judicial system has
completed its consideration of that claim. Reducing federal interference with, or supervision of, state court application of due process
principles thus requires the placement of limitations on both habeas
and anticipatory equitable relief.
Nor is it especially surprising that restrictions on federal habeas
and expansion of the Younger doctrine should be occurring at the
present time. Both an expansive federal habeas jurisdiction and a broad
tolerance of federal interference with state proceedings would seem
appropriate either when substantive federal law is undergoing rapid
change, or when it is perceived that the particular institutional perspective of state courts will result in less than complete enforcement of
federal guarantees. The period of constant expansion of the scope of
federal guarantees11 2 appears to have largely come to an end, and
indeed there has been some retreat from the broad definitions previously given to substantive federal rights.113 At the same time, state courts
in the modem era do not exhibit the hostility toward federal law visible
in earlier times; indeed, some state courts are in fact giving more
expansive definition to state due process guarantees than the Supreme
Court has given to similar federal guarantees.1 14 The need for federal
supervision in order to ensure full implementation of federal rights
may accordingly be less than it was heretofore.
That we have so recently seen a considerable expansion in the
substantive scope of federal constitutional protections has an additional
and more subtle relationship to the current contraction of federal
habeas and expansion of the Younger doctrine. Broadening the scope
of federal guarantees has meant that federal issues govern and become
111. The drafters of article III clearly intended this function to be performed by
Supreme Court review of state court decisions. Today, however, the limited resources of

that Court and the certiorari policy make direct review by the Supreme Court a seldom
invoked exception, rather than the general rule. See note 115 infra.
112. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.

113. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417

U.S. 484 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See generally, Note, Civil
Rights in the Burger Court Era, 10 AKRON L. REV. 327 (1976).
114. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 502-03 (1977); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
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decisive in an ever wider variety of circumstances. If an operative
assumption of our dual judicial structure is that federal courts should
11 5
be the ultimate arbiters of controversies implicating federal rights,
then the enlargement of federally guaranteed rights must result in more
disputes being channeled into the federal courts. But this result may
conflict with other values implicit in our judicial system, relating to
efficiency, finality, and the preservation of mutual respect between the
state and federal judicial systems. 116 The restrictions on federal supervision imposed by the recent habeas and Younger decisions may be
viewed as ways of responding to these concerns by limiting the role of
federal courts and preserving the role of state courts without directly
cutting back on the substantive scope of federal rights themselves.
While the Court has done some substantive cutting back as well, 117
it is possible to overestimate the extent to which the Burger Court has
effected a retrenchment of the scope of substantive constitutional rights
enunciated during the years of the Warren Court.' Several recent
cases may be interpreted as proceeding from the principle that state
procedures and institutions must be pursued and accorded respect
before a federal remedy will be imposed. For example, the denial of
relief in Paul v. Davis1 9 was apparently based on the conclusion that
one's reputation is not a "liberty" or "property" interest of constitutional magnitude. 120 An alternative basis for the decision in Paul, as
suggested later by Justice Stevens, would view that case as setting up
an "exhaustion" requirement of sorts: an individual may not obtain
federal relief against state deprecation of his liberty interest unless the
state-provided remedies are proven inadequate, and until he has pur115. It is well established that the norm contemplated by the Founding Fathers was
that most federal claims would be heard initially in state court, with a limited appeal to
the Supreme Court. See Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). In the first 90 years of our nation's history, state
courts were considered fully competent to adjudicate most federal claims, although
Supreme Court review was provided. It has been argued that the enactment of the
fourteenth amendment established that the federal courts were to be entrusted with the
task of vindicating federal rights. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180-81 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. See generally Freeman, Crisisin the FederalCourts:A DistrictJudge'sAnalysis,
13 GA. ST. B.J. 130 (1977).
117. See note 113 supra.
118. See Brennan, supra note 114; Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to EssentialGovernment Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1977).
119. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
120. Id. at 712. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56,
86-104 (1976). Paul indeed does not seem reconcilable with Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971). See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 293, 324-28 (1976).
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sued these state remedies.1 21 Similarly, the holding in Ingraham v.
Wright,122-- that schools need not afford notice and hearing prior to
the application of corporal punishment-was not based on the proposition that students have no liberty interest in protection from physical
discipline. Rather, the Court expressly recognized such an interest but
found it bounded by the state's common law concerning the right of
public school authorities to punish students physically. Because this
common law right was limited and was complemented by a common
law tort remedy for abuse, the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
procedural due process did not require notice and hearing. 123 Like
Paul, Ingraham can be interpreted as proceeding from the view that
state institutions and procedure must be pursued and accorded respect
before a federal remedy will be imposed. 124
These views of Paul and Ingraham are not offered as rebuttal to
those who object to the Burger Court's approach to liberty interests nor
as defenses of the two decisions themselves. Rather, these views
suggest that a major concern of the Burger Court has been to assure
that state judicial processes are accorded full respect by the federal
courts, and that this concern is evidenced in areas other than those
which directly involve the invocation of federal jurisdiction and remedial authority. Although this article is primarily about federal jurisdiction, it is important to recognize that the Court's actions on this
front are not being undertaken in a vacuum; the values and considerations of federalism underlying these actions have surfaced in other
decisions as well.
B.
1.

Habeas Corpus JurisdictionOver State Prisoners

The Brown-Noia Approach to FederalHabeas

Last Term, in Wainwright v. Sykes, l 21 the Court's most recent
habeas decision, Justice Rehnquist identified four questions which
may be asked about habeas for state prisoners, all of which implicate
important considerations of federalism:
(1) What types of federal claims may a federal habeas court
consider; (2) where a federal claim is cognizable by a federal
habeas court, to what extent must that court defer to a
resolution of the claim in prior state proceedings; (3) to what
121. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(expressing no opinion as to the merits of this explanation).
122.
123.
124.
125.

430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Id. at 672.
See generally Tribe, supra note 118, at 1100-01 n.135.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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extent must the petitioner who seeks federal habeas exhaust
state remedies before resorting to the federal court; (4) in
what instances will an adequate and independent state
ground bar consideration of otherwise
cognizable federal
126
issues on federal habeas review?
How one would answer these questions depends upon one's
conception of the role of state courts in adjudicating federal claims and
vindicating federal rights. And this conception, in turn, is inevitably
shaped by one's view of the competence of state court systems and
judges. The Burger Court seems inclined to answer these questions in
ways that will restrict federal jurisdiction, in striking contrast to the
Court's expansion of federal habeas over the previous two decades. In
Brown v. Allen,127 decided in 1953, the Court held that no matter how
fully the state courts had considered an issue of federal constitutional
law, that issue may be redetermined by a federal court presented with a
petition for habeas corpus. Then, in 1963, Fay v. Noia 128 closed the
circle by holding that a failure to raise a claim properly in state court,
resulting in a refusal by the state court to decide the claim on the
merits, does not preclude such consideration by a federal habeas court.
Indeed, the federal court would be required to consider the claim
unless the procedural default amounted to a "deliberate bypass" of
state court remedies by the defendant. 129 That same Term, in Townsend v. Sain, 130 the Court made clear that, in addition to an independent determination of all issues of federal law, the federal court must
hold an evidentiary hearing and determine the historical facts bearing
on the federal claims, if a state court has not given the defendant an
adequate hearing on the factual issues.
It has been suggested that once the relitigation rule of Brown v.
Allen was announced, the holding in Noia became inevitable. 131 The
former rule allowed a defendant to press his claim in both state and
federal court-in effect, giving him two opportunities to present issues
of federal law. If failure to litigate the claim in state court were held to
bar raising the claim on federal habeas, the defendant would be denied
even one bite of the apple. The perceived inequity in denying the
defendant a federal hearing for failing properly to litigate his claim in
126. Id. at 78-79.
127. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
128. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
129. Id. at 438-40.
130. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
131. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 526-27 (1963).
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state court-allowing two bites of the apple or no bite at all-may have
lent support to advocates of a broad habeas jurisdiction, in which all
constitutional claims are automatically reviewable whether or not
132
raised in the state proceedings.
Noia noted one exception to this broadened review: where the
defendant has intentionally foregone raising his claim in the state
courts. 13 3 In this situation the competing objectives of respect for state
judicial processes, finality, and efficient administration of justice argue in favor of prohibiting the raising of the claim on federal habeas.
The imposition of the heavy penalty of a bar to federal habeas would
certainly encourage defendants to allow state courts to pass on their
constitutional claims. Of course, the salient question after Noia be134
came what constituted "a deliberate bypass."
2.

The Current Approach: Limiting the Availability of Federal
Habeas Review

The decisions in Brown, Noia, and Townsend engendered a
heated and voluminous debate in the literature, 135 and launched several
attempts by state court judges and others to get Congress to enact
countervailing legislation. 136 However, until the 1975 Term, the scope
of the federal habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners remained
basically unchanged.
In the last two Terms the Court has significantly undermined the
broad holdings of Brown and Noia. In Stone v. Powell, 137 the Court
held that where there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate a
fourth amendment claim in state court, that issue may not be raised in a
federal habeas proceeding. Stone thus squarely cuts back, at least in
the fourth amendment context, on the relitigation rule enunciated in
132. See generally The Supreme Court 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 140-49

(1963).
133. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
134. "The test announced in Fay was not actually applied in that case. The Court

held that habeas relief was available notwithstanding the client's participation in the
waiver decision, and notwithstanding the fact that the decision was made on a tactical
basis." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95 n.3 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also id. at 94 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (courts have generally not followed Noia's
suggestion that the waiver must be made personally by the defendant; however, a
deliberate bypass has sometimes not been found where the claimed right is deeply
embedded in the Constitution, the procedural default was insubstantial, or the result
would be unjust).
135. See generally Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1038, 1113-54 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Report of the Comm. on Habeas Corpus, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Sept. 1963, 33 P.R.D. 363, 367 (1964).
137. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Brown. Moreover, Stone also implies an approach different from that
of Noia. The holding in Stone was not merely that fourth amendment
claims which were actually fully and fairly litigated in the state courts
will no longer be relitigated on federal habeas corpus. Rather, Stone
held more broadly that a petitioner may not raise his fourth amendment
claim on federal habeas if there was an "opportunity" to litigate the
claim fully and fairly in the state courts. 3 8 This wording of course
encompasses the Noia situation-in which the defendant fails to avail
himself of a full and fair opportunity to pursue his fourth amendment
claim in state court. Indeed, it is not surprising that Brown and Noia
should simultaneously be undermined, for, in the view of at least some
commentators, the latter was logically compelled by the first.
This suggests that the general rule announced in Stone could have
been set forth as a fundamental and comprehensive alternative to the
Brown-Noia approach to federal habeas. This alternative would provide a system whereby, rather than allowing habeas litigation of the
constitutional claim in virtually all instances, 139 such litigation would
be allowed only where the claim could not be fully and fairly litigated
in the state courts. The salient question would then become what
constitutes a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate a constitutional
claim.
However, there exist two sources of difficulty with such a system.
First, it may be desirable to treat different constitutional claims differently for purposes of federal habeas. While the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" rule may be appropriate for fourth amendment claims,
a less stringent standard-allowing for greater habeas review-may be
preferable for other types of claims." Second, it may not be desirable
to apply the same standard in cases in which the petitioner failed to
raise his constitutional claim in the state courts as is applied in cases in
which the petitioner did litigate his claim in the state courts.
The Supreme Court has recognized that whether the claim has been
raised in state proceedings and what type of claim is being pressed are
relevant factors in ascertaining the appropriateness of federal habeas
138. Id. at 482.
139. This is subject, of course, to the Noia exception where there has been a
"deliberate bypass."
140. This much is stated in Stone. Essential to the holding in that case was the Court's
determination that one fundamental purpose of the exclusionary rule-discouraging
police activity in violation of fourth amendment rights-is adequately achieved upon its
pre-conviction application at trial, and state review. Thus, the Court concluded that: "In
this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the
Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial societal costs of application of the rule
persist with special force." 428 U.S. at 494-95 (emphasis added).
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review. Thus, the holding in Stone was explicitly limited to fourth
amendment claims, leaving open the development of alternative standards for relitigation of other constitutional claims.14 1 And in other
cases the Court has set forth an approach to the Nola situation-in
which the habeas petitioner failed to raise his claim in state proceedings-which does not directly refer to the full and fair opportunity rule
enunciated in Stone.
First, in Francis v. Henderson,142 decided the same Term as Stone
v. Powell, the Court held that a state habeas petitioner is barred from
raising a defective grand jury indictment claim which state law requires to be raised before trial unless he can show both cause for his
noncompliance with the state procedural rule and actual prejudice from
the alleged defect in the indictment process. 14 3 Last Term, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 144 the Court imported the "cause" and "prejudice"
standard enunciated in Francis to bar habeas review of an alleged
Miranda violation where the petitioner had, contrary to the state's
contemporaneous objection rule, failed to object to admission of his
confession at trial. Although the Court explicitly refused to speculate
as to whether the cause and prejudice standard would be applied to the
Nola factual situation 1a-where the petitioner failed to pursue state
appellate remedies-Sykes leaves little doubt that the lenient Noia rule
has been replaced by a stricter waiver doctrine.146
141. In response to Justice Brennan's "hyperbol[ic]" -dissent, the majority emphasized that its holding was limited to fourth amendment claims. Id. at 494-95 n.37.
142. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
143. Id. at 542. Francisapplied to federal habeas for state prisoners the rule which

had been applied three Terms earlier to habeas for federal prisoners. In Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the Court concluded that the "deliberate bypass" standard

of Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217'(1969), the counterpart of Noia for federal
prisoners, was superseded with regard to grand jury claims by a provision of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). That provision required that
claims based on "defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment" be
raised prior to trial, and that failure to do so would "constitute waiver thereof," from

which relief could be granted only "for cause shown." Id. In Francis,the Court simply
held, without attempting to distinguish Noia, that "considerations of comity and federal-

ism require" that a state procedural rule serving the same interests as Rule 12(b)(2) be
given "no less effect." 425 U.S. at 541. The Court then proceeded to read its Davis
opinion as establishing two necessary elements of the "for cause shown" standard: a

showing of "cause" for the defendant's failure to raise his grand jury claim before trial
and a showing of "actual prejudice." Id. at 542.
144. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
145. Id.at 88 n.12.
146. See id. at 87 ("To the extent that the dicta of Fay v. Noia may be thought to have
laid down an all-inclusive rule rendering state timely objection rules ineffective to bar

review of underlying federal claims in federal habeas proceedings
limited by Francis, which applied a different rule ..

").

. . .

its effect was
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The Court's recent decisions are better explained as an exercise of
equitable discretion, growing out of concerns of federalism, to withhold federal remedial power which is within the congressionally authorized federal judicial authority, rather than as new statutory or
constitutional interpretations. Initially, it is important to recognize that
federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners depends largely, if not
entirely, upon the existence of an authorizing statute. 4 7 That statute
extends, in language which has remained essentially the same since its
enactment in 1867, federal habeas review to prisoners "in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.'1 48 Admittedly, the Stone opinion could be read as asserting
that once an individual has received the opportunity for one full and
fair hearing on his fourth amendment claims, he has received all of the
process due him under the Constitution, and his custody is not unconstitutional even if the first court's determination might be erroneous
from a habeas court's perspective. 149 Similarly, the Francis-Sykes
cause and prejudice standard could be understood as extending to the
habeas context the denial of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
where there exists an adequate and independent state procedural
ground for sustaining the conviction.
However, the Court itself noted in Francis150 and in Sykes 15 1 that
the standard there set forth was neither constitutionally nor statutorily
compelled. Rather, it was related to the appropriate exercise of judicial
147. Federal habeas over state prisoners is not expressly required in the Constitution.

Although article 1,§ 9, cl.2 provides that: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended .... ," this Suspension Clause apparently was intended only to
protect federal prisoners. See Pollak, Proposalsto CurtailFederalHabeas Corpusfor
State Prisoners:CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 63 & n.73 (1956);
Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, supra note 135, at 1272. Moreover,
in light of Congress' plenary power under article III to decide not to create lower federal
courts, and to control their jurisdiction once created, it is difficult to argue that a state

prisoner has a constitutional right to a federal, as opposed to a state, habeas forum.
Finally, only a very broad reading of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
would create a right to a federal habeas remedy for a prisoner confined under state
authority. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1513-14 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas
Corpus, supra note 135, at 1266-74.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
149. However, if one full and fair opportunity to litigate a constitutional claim were to

imply that the individual is not in custody in violation- of the Constitution, then it is
difficult to ascertain the jurisdictional basis for reversal on direct appeal of the state

court's conclusion, after full and fair consideration, that an allegation of constitutional
error is without merit.
150. 425 U.S. at 538-39.
151. 433 U.S. at 84 (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. at 538-39).
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power. Stone, too, is best understood as an exercise of discretion not
to assert jurisdiction admittedly within the federal habeas power. 152
The considerations of comity, orderly procedure, and finality which
underlie both the waiver doctrine of Francis-Sykes and the nonrelitigation rule of Stone appear to be within the habeas statute's
conferral of discretion upon the habeas court to "dispose of the matter
153
as law and justice require."
Whether seen as new statutory construction, as the making of
constitutional common law, or as an exercise of judicial restraint, the
Court in the last two Terms clearly has restricted the scope of federal
habeas review. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Sykes, the Court's
habeas decisions illustrate an "historic willingness to overturn or
modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the
statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained
15 4
unchanged."
3.

The Meaning of Stone and Francis-Sykes

I foresee three major areas of uncertainty in the wake of Stone,
Francis, and Sykes. First, the substance of the standards there announced-'"full and fair opportunity" in Stone, and "cause and prejudice" in Francis and Sykes-must be fleshed out. Second, to the
extent the standards are not commensurate, it must be determined
which governs in cases where the claim was not raised in state proceedings. Third, we may hazard a prediction as to which constitutional
claims, besides those raised in Stone, Francis, and Sykes, the standards set forth in these opinions apply.
a. Prerequisitesto Federal Habeas Relief. Whatever the precise meaning of "full and fair opportunity" might be, it does seem
clear that the standard focuses on the adequacy of the judicial process
which led to the petitioner's incarceration. This is a fundamentally
different approach to federal habeas-and one which held sway at an
152. See 428 U.S. at 494 n.37. Alternatively, Stone may be read as holding that judge-

made rules, as a form of "constitutional common law" devised to effectuate constitutional rights, are not appropriate for habeas review once there has been a full and fair
opportunity to litigate them at trial or on direct appeal. See Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. I4. REV. 1, 23,
27-30 (1975). Under this theory, an allegation of violation of the Court-imposed Miranda
warnings would also be barred from habeas review if the Stone standards were met.
Dicta in Sykes suggest that, indeed, Stone applies also to Miranda violations not going to
the voluntariness or reliability of the confession. See text accompanying notes 149-50
supra.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1976).
154. 433 U.S. at 81.
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earlier time in the history of that jurisdiction-than the approach
represented by the relitigation rule of Brown v. Allen. The latter
inquires as to whether the state court made any errors of constitutional
law; if the answer is yes, the prisoner's detention violates the Constitution, and assuming the error was not harmless, habeas corpus must
issue. In the words of the late Professor Hart:
[Brown v. Allen] seems to say that due process of law in the
case of state prisoners is not primarily concerned with the
adequacy of the state's corrective process or of the prisoner's personal opportunity to avail himself of this process
. . . but relates essentially to the avoidance in the end of any
underlying Constitutional error .... "I
Fay v. Noia expressly articulated this view of due process, and set
forth a lengthy analysis of the history of federal habeas jurisdiction, in
an attempt to show that the federal habeas statute contemplates relitiga15 6
tion of constitutional questions in a federal forum.
Stone's focus on the sufficiency of the process by which the state
court resolved the prisoner's constitutional claims, on the other hand,
does not necessarily attempt to determine whether the state court's
application of constitutional standards was "correct" in some absolute
sense. Notwithstanding the version of history advanced by Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Fay v. Noia, all of the commentators apparently agree that this second type of approach was followed
by the Supreme Court, for all types of constitutional claims, at least
until 1923; 157 and Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Noia asserts that it
158
uniformly controlled analysis until the decision in Brown v. Allen.
The consensus seems to be that, prior to 1915, a state prisoner was
not deemed to be held "in violation of the Constitution" unless the
convicting court lacked jurisdiction. 159 If a state prisoner had been
155. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chartof the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106 (1959).
156. 372 U.S. at 415-26.
157. See generally, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 1454-56.
158. 372 U.S. at 456-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Powell's opinion for
the Court in Stone does not expressly take a side in this historical debate, see 428 U.S. at

474-78, his earlier concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), which urged the Court to adopt the position it eventually accepted in Stone,
denounced the Nola Court's historical analysis and aligned itself with the version of
history advanced by the commentators. See id. at 252-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
159. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 135, at
1045-50. The concept of jurisdiction was expanded at this time to encompass two classes
of cases beyond those in which the court lacked subject-matter competence: first, those
in which conviction was grounded on an unconstitutional statute; and second, those in
which detention was based on an illegality in the sentence, rather than in the judgment of

conviction. Id.
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committed by a court with jurisdiction, he had been accorded due
process, regardless of any errors of law which the court may have
made. During this period, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized
that the writ of habeas corpus was not intended to serve as a substitute
for a writ of error.
In 1915, in the case of Frank v. Mangum, 16° the Supreme Court
adopted an approach which demanded more than a proper exercise of
jurisdiction by the state court. While retaining a focus on the state
court process which led to detention, rather than the mere presence or
absence of error by the state court, the Supreme Court scrutinized the
state proceedings in their entirety in order to determine whether Mr.
Frank had received a fair opportunity to raise and litigate his claim that
his trial had been unconstitutionally prejudiced by mob domination.
Since the state courts had fully and fairly adjudicated the merits of this
claim, the Court refused to reconsider it upon collateral attack; the
state had provided adequate "corrective process," and thus Frank's
custody was not in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 161 The Court did imply, however, that, had the state failed to
provide adequate "corrective process," habeas corpus would have
been available. 162
Notwithstanding the result in Frank, the Court reached the merits
of a mob-domination claim raised upon habeas corpus in Moore v.
Dempsey, 6 3 decided in 1923. The reasoning of the opinion, however,
is quite unclear. As Mr. Justice Harlan later noted: "The decision
• . . is sufficiently ambiguous to have meant all things to all men."164
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Noia, relied heavily on the
Moore case to support his view that, with the exception of Frank,
relitigation of federal questions has always been the rule in federal
habeas proceedings. 165 On the other hand, Justice Harlan read Moore
as a continuation of the approach taken in Frank. Under his interpretation, habeas corpus relief was available only because the state appellate court's perfunctory treatment of the question of mob domination
166
deprived the petitioner of a fair opportunity to litigate his claim.
160. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
161. Id. at 335-36, 344-45.

162. Id.at 335.
163. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
164. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 457 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 421-22.
166. Id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that Frank's
"adequate process" approach governed all habeas corpus cases until it was supplanted
by the relitigation model of Brown v. Allen. Id. at 456-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The

editors of the Hart & Wechsler casebook suggest the possibility of a third interpretation,
which mediates between the approaches of Frank and Brown. In this view, Moore is
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Disagreement over the meaning of Moore should not obscure the
fact that, in the view of Justice Harlan and the commentators, the
federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners underwent a considerable expansion sometime between enactment of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Allen. Rather than completely breaking with the past, Stone v. Powell
signifies a return to the "adequate process" approach of Frank, at
least for fourth amendment claims.
The Francis-Sykes cause and prejudice standard neither seeks to
prevent constitutional error nor expressly concerns itself with the
adequacy of the state's corrective process. Instead, the standard, like
the "deliberate bypass" rule which preceded it, is largely a waiver
doctrine. As with all waiver rules, it seeks to promote efficiency in
adjudication and finality in the law by providing that otherwise available rights or defenses cannot be asserted unless timely pursued. A
generally stated exception to any waiver doctrine-which is applicable
on direct review-is that waiver of constitutional claims must be
knowing and intelligent. 167 As the Chief Justice acknowledged in his
concurrence in Sykes, 16 8 one difficulty with the majority opinion's
"cause" requirement is that once trial has begun, the defendant himself does not participate in deciding whether to assert constitutional
error in the process of the trial. Thus, were it required that the
defendant personally decide not to assert a constitutional right, as Noia
implies, 169 neither Noia nor the "cause" portion of Francis-Sykes
would preclude habeas relief for a petitioner whose procedural default
occurred during the state court trial itself. Noia involved a procedural
default (failure to appeal) properly attributable to the defendant himself. Sykes did not, 17 0 and therein may lie the reason why Noia does
not satisfactorily dispose of the issue presented in Sykes. The majority
in Sykes dealt with this difficulty by ignoring it, stating merely that
Sykes failed to explain why he had not objected at trial to the introduction of his incriminating statement.171
regarded as holding that certain types of constitutional claims-such as an allegation of
mob domination-would always be cognizable on habeas, regardless of the adequacy of
the prior state consideration, while other types of claims, which do not go to the basic
integrity of the state's criminal process, would be reviewable on federal habeas only if
they were not fully and fairly considered by the state courts. HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 147, at 1469.
167. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
168. See 433 U.S. at 92-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
169. 372 U.S. at 439. See also note 134 supra.
170. The procedural default in Sykes was failure to object contemporaneously to
introduction of an inculpatory statement made by the defendant. 433 U.S. at 91.
171. Id. at 91 & n.14.
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It would have been more satisfactory for the Court to recognize that
the problem alluded to is presented not only on habeas review but also
on direct review in a unitary system. Generally, claims of trial error
not raised during trial may not be heard on appeal. 172 However, the
federal system and most state systems provide an exception to this
rule, under the "plain error" doctrine, 173 with additional protection
afforded by the constitutional guarantee that service of counsel must
meet a minimum standard of adequacy. 174 Although the term "plain
error" is not without ambiguity, it does at least provide a logical
standard to govern situations similar to the one presented in Sykes,
where the trial counsel, rather than the habeas petitioner, makes the
decision not to assert constitutional error. Whether the Court will move
toward a plain error standard to deal with cases such as Sykes remains
to be seen. But the waiver standard does not seem sufficient in cases
where the defendant did not participate in the procedural default. 175
b. Which Prerequisites Apply to Which Constitutional
Claims. There is little doubt that the rules enunciated in FrancisSykes and in Stone are not commensurate. Even if the Francis-Sykes
cause standard is roughly analogous to Stone's opportunity standard,
Francis-Sykes requires, in addition to a showing of cause, that the
petitioner demonstrate that the procedural default was prejudicial to
him. Justice White, concurring in Sykes, interpreted this requirement
as merely enunciating a "harmless error" rule in addition to the waiver
rule of the cause requirement. 1 76 The majority expressly refused to
172. Whether a procedural default should bar raising a constitutional claim is a

question which also arises on Supreme Court review of state court decisions. Generally,
as a matter of federal jurisdiction, procedural default constitutes an adequate and
independent state ground for rejection of the constitutional claim. See Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1815).
However, there may be an exception to this rule even on direct review in cases of
egregious error. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
173. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). At least one court has held the plain error doctrine to
apply on federal habeas as well. See Leavitt v. Howard, 332 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1971),
reversed on other grounds, 462 F.2d 992 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).

174. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
175. The majority opinion in Sykes stressed that the defendant is normally held
responsible for trial decisions made by counsel. 433 U.S. at 91 & n.14. See Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). See also note 134 supra.
Justice White in concurrence expressed the view that with respect to errors made at
trial, if counsel is aware of the applicable law, there is no cause for his failure to abide by
the state's procedural rules. In Justice White's view, such a failure amounts to a
"deliberate bypass" within the meaning of Noia. See 433 U.S. 98-99 (White, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 99.
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explain what a showing of prejudice required,17 7 but did state that "the
other evidence admitted at trial was substantial to a degree that would
negate any possibility of actual prejudice" to Sykes from the admission of his confession. 178 Of course, habeas courts have always had
equitable discretion to deny relief even when constitutional error is
found, where that error is harmless. 179 The Court's careful enunciation
of a prejudice standard suggests that that standard is meant to place a
greater limitation on federal habeas relief than does the harmless error
180
rule.
Since the standards in Stone and in Francis-Sykes are not equivalent, it becomes important to ascertain which will govern situations in
which the petitioner failed to litigate his constitutional claim in the
state court. I think the answer is that the standard will depend on what
type of constitutional claim is asserted. Francis and Sykes involved,
respectively, a challenge to grand jury composition and a challenge to
the introduction of an inculpatory statement, and in these situations the
Court has decided that the cause and prejudice standard should apply.
However, the Court explicitly noted in Sykes that the "full and fair
opportunity" rule of Stone might provide an alternative ground for
deciding whether petitioner Sykes could raise his constitutional claim
in a federal habeas action.1 8' The footnote went on to state that, if this
approach were taken, the question facing the court would be whether
the "bare allegation of a Miranda violation (without accompanying
assertions going to the actual voluntariness or reliability of the confession)" is proper for federal habeas corpus review where the Stone
1 82
standard has been met.
177. Id. at 90-91.
178. Id. at 91.
179. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). The harmless error rule incorporated in the federal
rules is not worded as a prejudice standard. It states that, "any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. The Sykes
prejudice standard, on the other hand, would apparently exclude even errors affecting
substantial rights if other evidence of the petitioner's guilt is sufficient. See 433 U.S. at
91.
180. Perhaps the Court intended for the standard to protect petitioners whose guilt
appears to have been wrongly inferred as a result of constitutional error. If so, the
prejudice standard would be consistent with certain dicta in Stone suggesting that the
"full and fair opportunity" non-relitigation rule is limited to alleged constitutional errors
which are not guilt-related. See 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31. Of course, under Sykes, even if
the petitioner is able to show prejudice, he is denied habeas relief unless he can also
show "cause." Stone, on the other hand, suggests that with respect to claims going to
innocence or guilt, habeas relief may be available even if there was a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim in state courts. See id. at 494-95 n.37.

181. See 433 U.S. at 87 n.ll.
182. Id.
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This statement can be read as indicating that the strict Stone
standard would not be appropriate in situations where more than a
"bare allegation of a Miranda violation" is made. In such situations
the defendant would be afforded habeas relief upon a showing of cause
and prejudice, even though he bypassed a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his claim in the state courts. This interpretation is consistent
with the statements in Stone implying that where an allegation of
constitutional violation casts doubt on the guilt of the petitioner by, for
instance, striking at the reliability of the factfinding process itself,
federal habeas review is not precluded merely because the petitioner
was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in the state
courts. 18 3 The Court in Stone contrasted claims going to the reliability
of the factfinding process with the "typical Fourth Amendment
claim," in which "a convicted defendant is usually asking Society to
redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his

incarceration. " 184

Stone failed to explain, however, the criteria for determining
which types of claims should remain available for litigation on habeas
despite a full and fair opportunity to litigate them in state court. Justice
Brennan read the above-quoted passage to mean that the Court will
move in the future to restrict the availability of habeas for all claims
that are not "guilt-related," and he proceeded to list claims which
might fall into this category. 185 This forecast may have been unduly
gloomy. First, several of the listed claims appear to bear some relation
to the reliability of the factfinding process, and thus are at least
somewhat "guilt-related." For example, the right to a jury trial is at the
very heart of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial, and the right to
a speedy trial ensures that guilt or innocence will be determined on the
basis of reasonably fresh evidence.
The exclusion of evidence resulting from unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures and the extension of the right to counsel
to encompass pre-trial line-ups protect the integrity of the factfinding
process by reducing the danger of mistaken identifications. Moreover,
the privilege against self-incrimination was intended, in part, to pre183. See 428 U.S. at 479 (an "illegal search and seizure [does] not 'impugn the
integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable;'"
quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)); 428 U.S. at 491-92 n.31
("Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no innocent

person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values
important to our system of government.").
184. Id. at 491-92 n.31.

185. Id. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (double jeopardy, entrapment, selfincrimination, Miranda violations, and claims of invalid identification procedures).
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clude use of unreliable statements by an accused person. Indeed, the
Court's opinion in Stone indicates an awareness of the possible distinction between self-incrimination and right to counsel claims (at least
where more than a "bare" Miranda violation is involved), on the one
hand, and fourth amendment claims, on the other. In discussing the
development of the federal habeas jurisdiction, the Court described a
line of cases in the courts of appeals which held that fourth amendment
claims could not be raised by federal prisoners petitioning for relief
under section 2255. According to the Stone Court,
[t]he primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in that
claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the
integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as
inherently unreliable .... "186
Although the Court further noted that this rationale was rejected in
Kaufman v. United States,187 which held that fourth amendment
claims could be raised on a section 2255 motion, Kaufman appears to
have been all but overruled by Stone.
I believe, however, that there is a more fundamental problem with
Justice Brennan's analysis. The Court should not, and perhaps will
not, consign all claims which are not "guilt-related" to the full and
fair hearing approach set out in Stone. That phrase does not adequately
capture the range of factors that the Court actually considered in
Stone. I would focus instead on the Court's quotation of the "intolerable restraints" language from Fay v. Noia and its statement that a
fourth amendment claim has no bearing on the "basic justice of...
88
incarceration." 1
Certainly, the extent to which a claim relates to the reliability of the
factfinding process is one factor to consider in evaluating the "basic
justice" of a prisoner's incarceration. 189 But are not claims that the
state court lacked jurisdiction, or that a prisoner was convicted under
an unconstitutional statute (for instance, one that contravenes first
amendment rights), also core cases? From a historical standpoint, they
certainly are, yet they relate to the prisoner's "innocence" only in the
190
most existential sense.
186. Id. at 479.
187. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
188. 428 U.S. at 492 n.31.
189. Claims which seriously undermine the legitimacy of the guilt-determination-for
example, claims of mob-domination, lack of counsel, excessive pre-trial publicity, knowing use of perjured testimony and, notwithstanding Justice Brennan's projected
"enemies list," denial of the right to a jury trial-are among the strongest cases for
exercise of the federal habeas jurisdiction.
190. Perhaps substantive due process claims should also be considered core cases.
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Beyond these core cases, analysis might turn on several factors. In
addition to the lack of a connection between fourth amendment claims
and the reliability of the factfinding process, Stone focused on three
criteria which might be relevant to future decisions. First, the Court
noted that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a judge-created
remedy designed to effectuate, rather than to become a part of, the
underlying constitutional right. 19 1 In other words, the rule is an example of what Professor Monaghan has denominated "constitutional
common law." 192 The Court might be more willing to limit supervision of alleged errors in applying this judicially created remedial law
than of alleged errors in dealing with rights directly guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Second, the Court observed that the exclusionary rule is not a
"personal constitutional right" designed to redress the injury to the
defendant's rights, but rather a remedy created to safeguard fourth
amendment rights in general by deterring unlawful police conduct. 193
To the extent that a claim only protects the rights of people other than
the habeas petitioner, it clearly states a weaker challenge to the basic
194
justice of his incarcertaion.
Finally, the Stone Court devoted considerable attention to the
functional inquiry of whether the purpose behind the fourth amendment exclusionary rule--deterrence of police misconduct-would be
materially advanced by allowing fourth amendment claims to be relitigated in a federal habeas proceeding. The Court doubted that any
significant increase in deterrence would occur and,'as a result, was
unwilling to incur the costs of extending a broad habeas remedy to
such claims. 195 In contrast, the purposes underlying personal rights
guaranteed directly by the Constitution--even those, such as the right
not to be placed in double jeopardy and the right to a properly
constituted grand jury, which do not relate to the reliability of the
191. 428 U.S. at 486. Other examples might include the Miranda requirements,
designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel at
pre-trial line-up, intended to safeguard the right of confrontation and, more generally,
the right to a fair trial. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

192. Monaghan, supra note 152.
193. 428 U.S. at 487-88.
194. In this regard, I would distinguish fourth amendment claims from claims of
Miranda or Wade-Gilbert violations. At the time the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule is applied, it is too late to repair the damage to the defendant's constitutional rights,

whereas exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda or Wade-Gilbert rights
does serve to protect the underlying constitutional rights of the person on trial, as well as

of future suspects.
195. Id. at 482-95.
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factfinding process at trial-would seem to be furthered in almost
every case by allowing relitigation upon federal habeas.
CONCLUSION

In the last two decades, federal habeas corpus has been an important instrument for implementation of an expanding array of federal
rights. The recent judicially created limitations on the circumstances in
which that remedy may be invoked contemplate that, with few exceptions, state courts are willing and able to afford full protection for these
federal rights.1 96 This development mirrors the Younger doctrine extensions mentioned earlier, which were expressly based on the assumption that "state judges will be faithful to their constitutional
responsibilities." 197 To some degree, these developments may contain
a self-justifying element: to the extent that they create incentives for
improvement in the quality of state court processes of decision, the
need for federal supervision should decrease.
Nevertheless, it would be unfortunate to presume that state and
federal courts are invariably interchangeable. We should bear in mind
Chief Justice Warren's statement that "[i]t is essential that we achieve
a proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state court
systems, assigning to each system those cases most appropriate in the
light of the basic principles of federalism." 198 Elimination of federal
diversity jurisdiction would enable a shift toward a more appropriate
distribution of judicial power for our contemporary situation. But
retrenchment in the area of federal authority over cases involving
federal law should proceed with caution.
In the early part of the ninteenth century, Justice Story was able to
"cheerfully admit that the judges of the state courts are . . . of as
much learning, integrity and wisdom, as those of the courts of the
United States."' 19 At the same time, however, he found a manifest
purpose in the Constitution to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts.2 00 In the absence of significant alteration of
the federal judicial structure, 2 1 direct federal appeal is no longer a
viable means of ensuring state court compliance with federal law.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
1959 ALI PROCEEDINGS 33. See also Neuborne, supra note 94.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
Id.
See note 57 supra.
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Today, also, we can "cheerfully admit" that state courts are generally
competent to vindicate federal rights, but still recognize that there may
be a meaningful number of cases in which state courts fail to afford
citizens their federal constitutional rights. As long as this is true, there
must be retained a core federal habeas jurisdiction and meaningful
avenues for affirmative federal relief from state judicial actions that are
not in harmony with the national Constitution.

